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sion than in the previous year. When the Colonial Secretary spoke at Leicester of a new triple alliance or understanding between England, Germany and the United States, the German Foreign Secretary in his next speech to the Reichstag pointedly ignored an utterance which had echoed round the world. It was true enough that in mentioning the word alliance Chamberlain had overshot the mark, and it was equally true that the Boer War, which had begun on October 9, 1899, was detested in Germany. Yet it was a costly error not to nurture the tender plant of Anglo-German understanding sown at Windsor. The attitude of the German Government throughout the struggle in South Africa was correct enough, but there was no longer any confidence between the peoples. The holding up of German steamers outside Delagoa Bay, wrongly suspected of carrying contraband to the Boers, caused exasperation, while the so-called Yang-tse treaty of 1900, designed to defend British and German commerce against Russian encroachments in China, did more harm than good owing to differences of interpretation.

An alliance between England and Germany was officially discussed for the first and last time in 1901. When the Kaiser hurried to the deathbed of Queen Victoria in January of that year, Billow, who succeeded Hohenlohe as Chancellor in T9<DO, warned him not to commit himself. "English embarrassments will grow in the coming months, and therewith our price will rise. * , . It would be a masterstroke if Your Majesty succeeded in leaving the English their hope of future intimacy without prematurely binding ourselves. The threatened rapprochement with the Dual Alliance is only a nightmare invented to frighten us.* There was never much life in the ensuing negotiations* The proposal of an alliance,

according to Lansdowne, who succeeded Salisbury as Foreign Minister in 1900, came from Eckardstein, who represented the German Embassy during the illness of Hatzfeldt, his chief; but Eckardstein's report disingenuously attributes the initiative to the British statesman. Bulow naturally accepted the version which reached him, but he was not tempted by the imaginary bait. The problem at issue seemed to him quite simple. Germany was on good terms with Russia, and England was not. An Anglo-Russian war seemed probable, but why should Germany be dragged in ? If England would enter the Triple Alliance, that was another matter and her support would be welcomed; but nobody desired to take such a risky step.